Tripartite Game Analysis of Straw Burning Management Considering the Dispersed Locations of Farms

Abstract

Against the backdrop of the dual carbon strategy and rural revitalization, straw burning poses environmental and carbon emission pressures, while high collection and transportation costs coupled with insufficient policy incentives hinder its effective recycling. By constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model involving farmers, straw collection/storage/utilization enterprises, and local governments—incorporating farmer dispersion factors—this study conducts sensitivity analyses on fixed costs, storage/transportation costs, penalty levels, purchase prices, and subsidy intensity. It evaluates the marginal effects of policy tools on straw recovery efficiency and system stability. Results indicate that both fixed costs and storage/transportation costs influence system evolution, though through distinct mechanisms. Moderate penalties, reasonable prices, and subsidies promote farmer-enterprise coordination, maximizing both straw resource utilization and environmental benefits. Farmer dispersion primarily affects convergence speed without altering the final equilibrium. Overall, the stable equilibrium of the straw collection and transportation system relies more on institutional design and market incentives than on objective spatial factors. Moderate penalties, prices, and subsidy policies can effectively promote tripartite coordination, achieving maximized straw resource utilization and environmental benefits. This provides a theoretical basis for optimizing rural straw management policies and offers guidance for achieving green transformation and sustainable agricultural development.